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This paper complements McCarthy’s “The well designed child”, in part by putting it
in a broader context, a space of sets of requirements and a space of designs, and in
part by relating design features to development of mathematical competences. I moved
into AI hoping to understand myself, especially hoping to understand how I could
do mathematics. Over the ensuing four decades, my interactions with AI and other
disciplines led to: design-based, cross-disciplinary investigations of requirements, especial
those arising from interactions with a complex environment; a draft partial ontology
for describing spaces of possible architectures, especially virtual machine architectures;
investigations of how different forms of representation relate to different functions;
analysis of biological nature/nurture tradeoffs and their relevance to machines; studies of
control issues in a complex architecture; and showing how what can occur in such an
architecture relates to our intuitive concepts of motivation, feeling, preferences, emotions,
attitudes, values, moods, consciousness, etc. I conjecture that working models of human
vision can lead to models of spatial reasoning that would help to support Kant’s view
of mathematics by showing that human mathematical abilities are a natural extension
of abilities produced by biological evolution that are not yet properly understood, and
have barely been noticed by psychologists and neuroscientists. Some requirements for
such models, are described, including aspects of our ability to interact with complex
3-D structures and processes that extend Gibson’s ideas concerning action affordances,
to include proto-affordances, epistemic affordances and deliberative affordances. Some of
what a child learns about structures and processes starts as empirical then, as a result
of reﬂective processes, can be recognised as necessary (e.g., mathematical) truths. These
processes normally develop unnoticed in young children, but provide the basis for much
creativity in behaviour, as well as leading, in some, to development of an interest in
mathematics. We still need to understand what sort of self-monitoring and self-extending
architecture, and what forms of representation, are required to make this possible. This
paper does not presuppose that all mathematical learners can do logic, though some fairly
general form of reasoning seems to be required.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction: Motivations for doing AI
Some people work in AI because they hope to produce useful or at least entertaining or impressive machines, often
tailored to a particular application area, e.g., a personal assistant, an air traﬃc controller, a machine controller, an automated
designer, a game character, or a tutor of some kind. Some aim to produce machines with human-like capabilities, without
caring whether the mechanisms used have anything in common with biological information-processing mechanisms (e.g.,
brain mechanisms), on the assumption that such machines will have many applications.
In contrast, the primary interest of some AI researchers is science. Some of them aim to model in detail various aspects
of biological intelligence, e.g., producing a machine that uses mechanisms that are biologically plausible and which has, as a
result, ant-like, or lobster-like, or human-like competences. It is not always noticed that such goals are extremely ill-deﬁned,
since human-like systems would include systems like infants, toddlers, brain-damaged humans, schizophrenics, bricklayers,
architects, composers, poets, murderers, people with dementia, people with autism, mathematicians, conjoined twins and
even politicians. Others who are interested in AI as science include the study of non-biological mechanisms that are capable
of producing various kinds of competence, including mechanisms thought to be on the path to so-called “Human-level AI”,
an ill-deﬁned goal for the reasons mentioned, though made a little more precise by McCarthy, who explicitly prefers to
focus only on desirable and useful aspects of human intelligence, for instance in “The well designed child”.
This paper attempts to complement his discussion, in part by putting it in a broader context, the space of possible well
designed young “self-extending” progeny, and in part by focusing on a particular kind of development: the development
of mathematical competence. The broader scientiﬁc goal includes understanding the space of possible requirements for
behaving systems and how those requirements relate to the space of designs for information processing systems that satisfy
different sets of requirements more or less well. We could call this broad science the “Informatics of Intelligence” (IoI?)—
a superset of AI as currently understood by most people.
The concept of a virtual machine, including virtual machines made of other, interacting, concurrently active virtual ma-
chines, some of which may be discrete dynamical systems others continuous dynamical systems, will be shown to play an
A. Sloman / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 2015–2034 2017important role in specifying some of the more sophisticated designs, including designs for young individuals that develop
self-awareness and self-control, and extend their information-processing architectures.
That will also help to bring out some of the relationships between this kind of science, and the physical sciences,
including showing how it is possible for mental phenomena to play a causal role in a world where all mental phenomena
are implemented in physical mechanisms.
Much of McCarthy’s work, including “The Well-Designed Child” contributes to the huge task of collecting sets of re-
quirements that need to be met by various interesting kinds of machine (including animals of various kinds). Additional
requirements are presented below, in the context of a theory of what the space of problems is like. In particular, a largely
unnoticed aspect of the ability of an intelligent young animal or robot to grow its own mind will be shown to provide
the basis of key mathematical competences in humans, and possibly future robots. Insofar as the mathematical knowledge
gained by such learners is both non-empirical and substantive (i.e. not deﬁnitional and not purely logical) this will provide
a new kind of support for something like the philosophy of mathematics proposed by Immanuel Kant, in opposition to
David Hume and many analytical philosophers. It points to a form of learning that is different from, and in some ways more
powerful than, the essentially statistical Bayesian learning that has come to dominate AI research recently.
2. A broader view of AI as science
The goal of replicating functionality of one biological species whose members vary enormously is ill-deﬁned, as explained
above. Moreover, its scientiﬁc value is limited, for two reasons.
First, you cannot really claim to understand something on the basis of a working model replicating its behaviour, if
you do not know what difference it would have made if various aspects of the model had been different. Knowing how
the functionality would have changed had various features of the design been different requires investigation of at least
a neighbouring space of possible designs, and how those designs relate to different sets of requirements. This requires
understanding design tradeoffs in a space of designs and a space of niches. Designs can be described at various levels of ab-
straction. For complex information-processing systems there are important reasons presented in Section 4.1 for considering
designs at various virtual machine levels.
Second, the focus of all attention on human competences effectively ignores the fact that humans are one species among
many, with a great many similarities and differences that need to be explained. Those species all have evolutionary histories,
and the individual members have developmental trajectories. There is a vast space of structures and processes whose rela-
tionships and dynamics need to be explained if we are to understand the world we live in, and if the concepts, formalisms
and theories of AI (or IoI) are to be deemed successful they should be able to account for the evolution, development and
competences of that whole gamut of possible organisms with many different kinds of intelligence, or at least an interestingly
varied subset of the gamut.
Even if biologists and psychologists wish to restrict their attention to the actual organisms produced by evolution on our
planet, engineers and philosophers are motivated to explore a richer space of possibilities, including both organisms that
might have evolved but did not, and possible machines of various kinds that might be produced in the future. From that
point of view, AI as science looks incomplete unless it includes the study of the whole space of possible sets of requirements
(“niche space”) and the whole space of possible designs for behaving systems (“design space”) and the relationships between
the two spaces, including the tradeoffs between design alternatives relating to particular sets of requirements. See Fig. 1.
I have been pursuing this broader goal for many years, in the context of AI,1 most recently in collaboration with a biolo-
gist interested in animal cognition2 and also working with AI colleagues in an EU-funded robotic project.3 Over the years I
have referred to this as “the design-based approach”. I now prefer McCarthy’s less cumbersome label “the designer-stance”,
though I do not know whether he accepts the implied requirement to explore spaces of designs and sets of requirements.
3. Virtual machines and theories of everything informational
3.1. The potential scope of AI
Some would say the goal of studying those two spaces and their relations is far too ambitious, perhaps a symptom of
megalomania. But it is no more so than the grand aim of the physical sciences to ﬁnd a general way of understanding all
the kinds of physical and chemical structures and processes that can occur, from the very smallest to the whole physical
universe.
What physics does not include, however, because it lacks the required conceptual tools and theories, is the study of
information and information processing mechanisms—which is why AI is needed. Even computer science as normally prac-
tised and taught is not general enough: it deals with mechanisms, structures, processes and formalisms with syntax that
1 See, for example, [43,45–47,49–51,53–57,59,62,66–69].
2 Jackie Chappell: [4,64,65]. We have now joined primatologist Susannah Thorpe in an attempt to analyse cognitive requirements for orangutan arboreal
locomotion using compliant supports.
3 The CoSy project: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/.
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structured descriptions, e.g., of what a design can and cannot do in various conditions, not just numerical measures. There are interacting trajectories of
various sorts in both spaces, not shown here, including evolutionary, developmental and social trajectories. Biological trajectories are not continuous, but
gaps are usually small. Trajectories in engineering labs can include large discontinuities, and unlike biological trajectories can include non-functional cases.
machines can manipulate. But computer science, except where it overlaps with AI, is not concerned with the semantic un-
derstanding required by a machine (or animal) in order to interact purposefully with the environment, as opposed to the
semantics required by designers of machines who aim to produce machines that in turn produce the behaviour they (the
designers, not the machines) desire.4
The relevant concept of information here is not the misleadingly named numerical “information” measure of Shannon
and Weaver, related to channel capacities and signal statistics, but a notion of semantic content, that supports notions of
truth, falsity, inference, consistency, and contradiction. Those notions are not parts of physics, though the work of physicists
exempliﬁes them.
Some physicists attempt to bridge the gap between “meaningful” information processing and physical mechanisms.
A well-known example is Henry Stapp, who believes that the only way to make sense of the equations of quantum physics
is to allow some sort of consciousness to be involved in selecting between alternative possibilities. In an interview reported
in 2006 he claimed “. . . the core idea that the events in our streams of consciousness are two-way causally linked to events in the
physical world lies at the intuitive heart of our daily dealings with reality” [70]. What I’ll say below about virtual machines is
consistent with that, but Stapp wants to argue that according to classical physics it is impossible for mental phenomena
to be causally eﬃcacious, whereas it is possible in quantum physics. He is not making the standard naive assumption that
quantum indeterminacy makes room for human free will, but puts forward arguments taking account of the details of the
mathematics of quantum theory: “We are dealing here with the sophisticated way in which mental intention inﬂuences quantum
processes in the brain. Ideas do not simply push classically conceived particles around!” and “Why hang onto one of the most con-
troversial aspects of a materialist worldview, namely the notion that the causal eﬃcacy of our conscious efforts is an illusion, when
quantum theory seems to say just the opposite, and even provides the technical means for implementing the causal eﬃcacy of our
efforts?” (op. cit.).5
There are several problems with that attempt to unify physical and mental processes. The ﬁrst is that it assumes that our
ordinary obscure, and in some ways muddled, everyday concepts of mentality (e.g., “consciousness”, “intention”, “feeling”)
are suitable terms to use in combination with the mathematically precise theories of quantum physicists. Explaining why
that is a dubious move would require an excursion into analytical philosophy.6 A second problem is that giving human
4 See http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/intentionality.html. As explained there, John Searle distinguished derived from intrinsic intentionality, a distinction
which John Haugeland expressed as derivative/original. Computer science could be described as concerned with giving machines derivative/derived semantic
competences, not intrinsic/original semantic competences. This view is qualiﬁed in [44].
5 For technical details, see Stapp’s paper.
6 Of the sort discussed in http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/logical-geography.html.
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physical mechanisms operated on earth before the evolution of human-like animals.
The third, and most important, objection (which I have put to Stapp in correspondence on open discussion lists in the
past, but which he ignores in his published papers) is that the concept of a virtual machine (VM), originally developed to
support development of complex information-processing systems, provides an alternative, and more substantial, explanation
of the relationship between mental and physical processes that is neutral between classical and quantum mechanics. I shall
try to explain what virtual machines are and why they are so important. That will require making explicit facts that are
obvious to many software engineers and often taken for granted, but not often stated, and certainly not usually included in
text-books on AI, cognitive science, or philosophy of mind. (An exception is Edelman’s [10].)
3.2. Different concepts of “virtual machine”
We need to distinguish two main notions of a VM, followed by various subcases. The ﬁrst main notion is of an abstract
speciﬁcation of a class of capabilities, as in “The Java VM”, or “the Linux VM” which is a sort of mathematical object (actually
a whole series of them, as new versions are developed).
The second main notion is of a process actually running, or runnable but currently dormant, in a machine, and doing or
capable of doing things. I call these “active virtual machines” (even though they can include temporarily inactive compo-
nents). The abstract speciﬁcation does nothing: it is just an abstract structure, a sort of mathematical object, like a scientiﬁc
theory, or a set of axioms, about which statements can be made and theorems proved. Active VMs, in contrast, do things,
allow things to happen, and prevent things happening. An active VM may be an instance of a particular abstract VM. When
a Java program runs, it uses an active VM that conforms to the abstract Java VM speciﬁcation, but the active instance can
make things happen while the abstract VM is no more causally active than a number. Different active Java VMs can exist
on different computers, doing different things, and changing their states, while the abstract VM they all instantiate remains
unchanged. Since I shall mostly only be talking about active VMs I shall not normally use the preﬁx “active”.
3.3. Varieties of active virtual machine
We can distinguish different sorts of active VM. For example, some emulate a possible physical machine, whereas others
do not: e.g., a virtual machine containing interacting 5-dimensional objects. Some active VMs, such as operating systems,
provide a general platform within which other more speciﬁc VMs can run and interact. These are sometimes referred to
as “system” or “system-level” VMs. Often a programming language is associated with a type of active system VM that
includes a set of mechanisms that are available to support programs written in the language, for instance mechanisms
for doing arithmetic, manipulating data-structures, constructing new procedures, and controlling procedure activations, or
concurrent threads. Are there naturally occurring VMs analogous to that, e.g., VMs in brains to support particular forms of
representation and operations on them?
A special subset of VMs could be thought of as “virtual reality” (VR) systems. They are simulations of something that
could happen, though not necessarily something physical. These are useful in planning, predicting, reasoning, and explaining,
and the notion of “imagining” covers many cases of this sort. Craik proposed in 1943 that evolution had produced such
abilities in animals [7], with the advantage that they could be used to work out consequences of actions. There are many
examples in Minsky’s [30].
There are more fundamental kinds of VM that are not necessarily simulators. Examples include parsing VMs, image
analysing VMs, calculating VMs, and VMs that perform logical inferences. We could call these “primary” VMs in contrast
with simulation VMs which are in a sense secondary to what they simulate. Of course, being a primary VM does not rule
out being used for simulation, since one primary VM can simulate another of the same type.
Some VMs allow more varied forms of process than others. One sort of variety comes from a ﬁxed set of mechanisms
whose activations can be combined in different ways, another from a VM that can grow new mechanisms, thereby acquiring
new capabilities—e.g., building new procedures, plans, formalisms or connections between subsystems. This may be, but
need not be, linked to physical growth, e.g., acquiring more memory, or another CPU to increase parallelism, or growing
more neurons. There are also much simpler sorts of change in which parameters are modiﬁed in an otherwise ﬁxed VM
structure.
3.4. Biological virtual machines
I suspect biological evolution “discovered” the need for many types of VM that we have not yet studied, and also
produced types of VM whose sophistication we have not yet matched, including varieties of self-constructing and distributed
VMs. The variety and the sophistication result from the number and variety of design problems (i.e. sets of requirements,
or niches) confronted in biological evolution, and the enormous versatility of the biological engines supporting evolution.
In order to achieve a better understanding of the full range of VMs found in living and artiﬁcial systems and the variety
of VM components that can be assembled to produce that range, we probably need a new language for describing the
components and ways of combining them to produce a systematic ontology of VMs. This could provide consistent and
widely accepted terminology. Unfortunately at present AI researchers describe the VMs they design in an ad hoc way, often
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“reactive” and “deliberative” have no agreed deﬁnitions.7
We also need a systematic language (with an ontology) for describing sets of requirements (niches), including naturally
occurring and artiﬁcial ones. This will require us to identify the problems evolution actually solved, instead of just assuming
that the problems are obvious and easily describable, as often happens. McCarthy implicitly criticises an assumption made by
many researchers when he writes “Evolution solved a different problem than that of starting a baby with no a priori assumptions”.
The importance of active, interacting, VMs is not widely understood, even by those who are well aware of virtual ma-
chines and use them every day. I shall try to explain why they are important for future developments in AI, as they seem
to have been for biological evolution.
4. Why virtual machines are useful in animals and machines
Nowadays we routinely use physical computers to run virtual machines, whose properties and behaviours are very dif-
ferent from the properties of the physical machines in which they are implemented. This aspect of computation has largely
been ignored by many who discuss the nature and signiﬁcance of information-processing, including many, though not all,
philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists trying to understand the implications of information-processing concepts
and mechanisms for their own ﬁelds.
4.1. Active, interacting VMs can reduce complexity for designers
An important reason for making use of VMs on computers is that they usually are much simpler (have fewer components
and fewer possible states and state-transitions) and therefore easier to design, extend, understand, test, and debug than the
physical processes that occur when they run.
When a word-processor or chess program starts up on a computer, that causes many changes in the memory of the
computer and alters the sequence of machine instructions executed by the CPU (or CPUs), though many previously run-
ning programs will continue running. Exactly which sequence of instructions occurs will depend not only on which other
processes were running, but which stages they have reached. Thinking about all the possible combinations of low-level pro-
cesses would be humanly impossible. Instead, use of virtual machines allows the designer to think about characters, words,
fonts, paragraphs, layout of text, pages, etc., or about chess pieces, moves, board locations, threats, defences, captures, win-
ning and losing in the second case.
If such a system needs to be modiﬁed it is usually the design at the VM level of operation that a programmer needs
to change. This is possible because the existence of compilers, interpreters, general purpose subroutines, garbage collectors,
operating systems, various communication protocols and high level interface speciﬁcations makes it possible for the system
designer to leave the mappings between virtual machines and physical machines as someone else’s problem. Describing
a virtual machine requires use of an ontology related to its functions and domain of application, whereas designing and
controlling the physical machine, or the digital circuit, requires a totally different ontology to be used. A subset of designers,
e.g., those concerned with compilers and device-drivers need to work with two different levels of ontology.8
4.2. VMs reduce combinatorial complexity for system designers
If human programmers designing complex word-processors were required to think through all the processes at the level
of digital electronics (as was required for the earliest mechanical and electronic computers running much simpler programs
than current operating systems and application packages) they would have to consider all the different ways in which huge
bit-arrays change as a result of paging operations, garbage collections, and context-switching in multi-processing systems,
an explosively complex task because of the vast amount of variability in what happens.
Moreover, even if such a bit-level or physics level design worked, it would have to be changed if new software had to be
installed to run at the same time, or if more memory were added to the computer, or a new kind of hard drive for swap
space. Even bigger changes would be required if the programs had to run on a new kind of CPU, or using memory with a
different size of addressable unit.
4.3. Beneﬁts of problem-decomposition
By separating the problems of producing a program that uses a certain VM layer, i.e. specifying what structures and
processes are to be created in that layer, from the problems of ensuring that a VM layer of that type is properly implemented
on a particular physical machine, designers turn an intractable task into two tractable tasks.
7 [59] suggests uses for new labels “proto-deliberative” and “fully deliberative”.
8 Alan Turing in effect demonstrated the possibility of virtual machines when he showed, in the 1930s, that some Turing machines can emulate others,
though the ontological differences there are small. The practical importance of virtual machines did not emerge until some time later. I think Ada Lovelace
understood the general principle a century earlier.
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required, that work across widely varying contexts and combinations of processing, and to take advantage of new technol-
ogy to implement improved (faster, cheaper, more compact, more reliable) physical systems running previously designed
systems. This depends on the use of at least two levels of design:
(a) designing and implementing a VM layer that supports certain classes of programs as long as mechanisms are provided
for mapping virtual objects, events and processes into physical mechanisms and their states and processes;
(b) designing working systems that can be implemented on that VM layer.
Task (a) includes designing formalisms, along with interpreters or compilers for the formalisms, collections of generally use-
ful subroutines, operating system interfaces, device drivers, and physical interfaces to several kinds of device (e.g., keyboard,
screen, hard drive, microphone, video camera, robot arm, temperature sensor, etc.), network protocols, transmission mech-
anisms, memory management mechanisms, and especially context-switching and saving mechanisms, that allow multiple
processes to be time-shared on one processor. Often this kind of support for a VM layer is provided on several different
physical machines, making the VM layer portable. However, portability may be partial—if not all features are available on all
physical implementations, e.g., if one implementation of a VM layer takes advantage of physical features available only on
some processors.
Not every new VM layer needs to be directly implemented in low level physical mechanisms: some are implemented
using a pre-existing VM, such as the VM speciﬁed as a Pentium processor or a Sparc processor or a combination of processor
and operating system. So VM layers can be stacked and combined in various ways, often using several layers of virtual
machinery. This is unlike combining VMs that provide different functionality on the same layer, e.g., a parser and a planner.
The separation of design tasks means that different VMs (e.g., word-processors, mail-handlers, chess-programs, simu-
lation packages, games) can be relatively easily implemented on a single VM layer (e.g., an operating system with a set
of compilers), and they will continue to function if that VM layer is re-implemented in different hardware (provided the
hardware has adequate speed and storage capacity for the task).
Often a VM layer is associated with a programming language (e.g., a Java, Lisp, C++ or Prolog virtual machine layer),
though higher level VMs implemented in a programmable VM need not themselves be programmable, or if they are pro-
grammable they may use an application speciﬁc programming language.
We could call the use of VM layers vertical modularity. This is different from horizontal modularity, i.e. the separation into
distinct modules that may or may not coexist. Both vertical and horizontal modularity support “separation of concerns” for
designers, maintainers, and so on.
4.4. Layered biological virtual machinery
It seems that long ago biological evolution started making use of separation of improvements in the design and implemen-
tation of new VM layers and improvements in use of existing VMs. Obvious examples are genomes producing individuals
that can learn many things, and the evolution of species in which different cultures can develop. There may be more subtle
and unobvious examples in varieties of individual learning. The VM layers produced in organisms are implemented in very
different physical mechanisms from VM layers that run on computers. Not much is known about how most of the abstract
VMs are implemented, e.g., the ability to be puzzled, the ability to form explanatory theories, the ability too take in many
abstract features of complex visual scenes, and many more. Neither is it known whether computing machines are capable
of replicating all brain functions in great detail.
Virtual machinery provides a particular kind of beneﬁt not for designers, but for the working systems themselves, as
some engineers are beginning to appreciate, e.g., [6] (mentioned below). This will now be explained.
4.5. Beneﬁts for individual machines, or animals, of using VMs
It is rarely noticed that “vertical modularity” or “vertical separation of concerns” is not just an issue for the engineering
process of designing and debugging complex systems: it is also important for any system that needs to monitor and control
itself at run time, as machines using schedulers, memory-management systems, ﬁle-access control systems, and many others
have to do, and as sophisticated AI systems will increasingly need to do. So, not only is the use of VMs useful for engineers
who design and build information-processing systems: it can also be important for sub-systems within the machine, that
monitor and control other systems—for example, a scheduler that ensures fair allocation of resources to different processes,
or a ﬁle-system manager that monitors and constrains reading and writing of ﬁles, or a self monitoring program that can
ﬁnd and ﬁx bugs in a running system.
These are examples of systems that need self-awareness and self-control. Self-awareness requires mechanisms that can
observe and describe what is going on within the system, and possibly form hypotheses about patterns or regularities in
the internal processes. Self-control requires mechanisms that can change what is going on, possibly using such patterns to
predict consequences of changes. The forms of representation used by such mechanisms in computers (e.g., logic, diagrams,
ﬂow-charts, etc.) are not discussed here: that they represent structures, events, processes and generalisations about what
is going on in the machine is all I am concerned with. Compare McCarthy in [23] and Kennedy in [20]: although neither
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of virtual machines implemented in the physical machinery.
The point is made explicitly by Clark et al. in [6]: the authors propose research on “a sort of network that can assemble
itself given high level instructions, reassemble itself as requirements change, automatically discover when something goes wrong, and
automatically ﬁx a detected problem or explain why it cannot do so”. They propose a new construct, “the Knowledge Plane, a
pervasive system within the network that builds and maintains high-level models of what the network is supposed to do, in order
to provide services and advice to other elements of the network. The knowledge plane is novel in its reliance on the tools of AI and
cognitive systems. We argue that cognitive techniques, rather than traditional algorithmic approaches, are best suited to meeting the
uncertainties and complexity of our objective.
For intelligent systems, that not only observe and modulate existing VMs running within themselves, but also have to
extend VMs, or even add new layers of virtual machinery, the processes will be far more manageable if what is being built
is a new VM using an old one, than if what has to be built is new digital or neural hardware, or a new way of connecting
up existing hardware. If the mechanisms involved in self-monitoring, self-control, self-modulation, self-extension had to be
designed to make physical changes instead of using VM levels, they would have to be re-designed whenever the hardware
technology changed, and also as the set of programs running on the computer changed.9
Finally, not only the development of individuals, but also the evolution of new biological species to provide new func-
tionality, can be much easier if separate VM layers exist, than if the design of each species is a non-modular tangle of
mechanisms. Something like this idea was proposed by Popper in [36], when he suggested that evolution might sometimes
proceed by giving members of a species new desires that can be activated when appropriate, that make them want to do
things that such animals previously did not do (e.g., wanting to get food from higher locations), which in turn could make
it beneﬁcial to evolve new behaviours to achieve those goals, which might then make it beneﬁcial to evolve new physi-
ology to support those behaviours (e.g., a longer neck, or more powerful muscles for jumping). Starting by providing new
desires implies a level of structure at which desires can be added or modiﬁed. The same goes for adding new behaviours or
modifying old ones.
5. Concurrent virtual machine processes in a serial computer
We have seen that separation of a complex design into different VM levels and different coexisting modules using those
VM levels can have beneﬁts in both engineering applications and in biological systems, and that this is particularly important
in intelligent systems that need to understand what is going on and take decisions at run time, especially decisions that
include self-monitoring, self-modulation and self-extension. However, the existence of coexisting interacting running VMs
has additional implications.
5.1. Concurrent causal inﬂuences on a sequential machine
Even if there is a single time-shared CPU, so that instructions are executed one at a time (ignoring pipelines for now),
the data-structures in memory that implement most of each active process continue to endure in parallel, and a process
that is not in control of the CPU may still be inﬂuencing other processes because its data-structures are interrogated by
running programs.
Moreover, there are often far more coexisting potential causes than actual ones, i.e. far more coexisting dispositions whose
existence is important even when they are not activated. E.g., some risky behaviours may be attempted if a rapidly activated
recovery mechanism is known to be available even if it is not doing anything when the decision is taken. So even in single-
processor computers there is far more parallelism than most people realise, including coexistence of multiple dispositions
and competences ready to be deployed if required. Interfaces to external devices or networks and additional processors can
extend that parallelism.
We have seen that when several virtual machines run concurrently, the set of physical processes that can occur at the
implementation level, is enormously complex and enormously varied, since what exactly goes on in all the central registers,
in the buses transferring bit patterns around the system, and in the various hardware interfaces, depends on which collection
of virtual machines happens to be running on the physical machine, on how they are phased in relation to one another, and
also on the operation of schedulers and memory management systems. By abstracting away from most of that detail and
representing only the important VM phenomena, we can understand and reason about behaviour of VMs whose invariant
features and causal relationships allow huge variations in physical event sequences that implement them.
9 There are subtle issues about the differences in causal powers of VMs based on compiled and interpreted code, which I do not have space to discuss here.
There are also subtle differences between the kind of monitoring and control that are possible when one part of a neural network continuously monitors
and modulates another, using “hard-wired” connections for the purpose, and when one piece of active software monitors and modulates another, which
usually requires the monitored subsystem to leave ‘traces’ of what it is doing, if it is a compiled program. An interpreter is less dependent on cooperation
from the programs it runs. Specialised hardware is required to enforce monitoring of compiled programs that do not cooperate by leaving traces, memory
management hardware being an example.
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I conjecture that those advantages of virtual machines, and possibly others, were “discovered” and exploited by biological
evolution long before human engineers thought of using them, and long before humans existed on earth, though details of
virtual machines and how they are implemented are very different in biological systems. One example, apparently unique to
humans, is the ability of brains using different human languages (e.g., English and Chinese) to use those languages to learn
and use the same mathematical, physical, and geographical facts. The physical, neural processes involved in using different
languages, will be different even when thought contents, calculations, inferences, or decisions, are the same. The brain
processes implementing a thought about night falling or about the solution to an equation will be different in speakers of
English and Chinese, yet the same VM event can occur in both.10 I suspect that future research will show the importance
of such separation of concerns, based on VMs, in many aspects of brain function, metabolism, individual development,
transformations of a genome across generations and use of social or cultural virtual machines.
5.3. Why the physical sciences have explanatory gaps
Mechanisms based in a VM layer are all implemented in physical systems, but their description and analysis requires
a science of information processing systems, including virtual machines that operate on virtual information structures
(not physical symbols as claimed by Newell and Simon—e.g., see [31]). That science needs many specialisms concerned
with special classes of structures, processes and mechanisms, for instance chess-playing VMs, parsing VMs, planning VMs,
spelling-correcting VMs, equation-solving VMs, movement-controlling VMs, VMs interpreting sensory data, and many others,
including VMs composed of collections of interacting VMs.
Describing the specialised VMs requires use of appropriate domain-speciﬁc ontologies, with their distinctive concepts
(e.g., pinning a chess piece, a win, a draw, an illegal move, an inconsistency, an improved strategy, a spelling error, a syntactic
error, etc.) which are not deﬁnable in terms of concepts of physics. (That indeﬁnability claim will have to be defended in
another paper.) Neither can the methods of the physical sciences produce measuring devices to detect occurrences of those
concepts. In general, their occurrence can only be detected by interacting VMs, which also include events that can only be
detected by interacting VMs.11
Dennett has suggested, e.g., in [9], that it is useful to take “the intentional stance” when dealing with other individuals
who have beliefs, desires, etc. Some of what he writes seems to imply that attributions of mental states and processes
are a matter of convenience rather than truth, and that they presuppose that the individual concerned is rational. (This is
similar to Newell’s notion of “the knowledge level” [32].) What I am suggesting is that far from merely being useful, it is a
prerequisite of proper functioning of components of a complex information processing system that the various components
take something analogous to the intentional stance to other parts of the system—that is, components of a complex virtual
machine are designed to treat other components as sources of information or as users of information, a different matter
from designing systems as producers and consumers of fuel, forces, energy, etc. A more detailed discussion would need
to distinguish information users and senders from receivers and senders of signals, i.e., information-bearers. Many devices
store, manipulate or transmit items such as bit-patterns, without having any need, or any ability, to treat them as expressing
information, e.g., things that may be true or false. However, that competence is required for computers with conditional
instructions [44].
5.4. Some philosophical implications
AI, broadly construed as the science of possible requirements for behaving systems and possible designs that meet those
requirements, is a major part of the science of information-processing systems, a science that complements the physical
sciences. I have argued elsewhere that this can revolutionise philosophy. For example, the relationships between virtual
machines (which are real, and can have real effects, despite their label) and the underlying physical machines echo many of
the philosophically puzzling features of the relationship between minds and brains: a point most philosophers have ignored,
or failed to understand, largely because they are ignorant of the philosophically interesting features of the virtual machines
they use every day. A notable exception is Pollock [35]. Dennett often refers to virtual machines, giving useful explanations
for the beneﬁt of philosophers and others, but denies that they really exist: he thinks talk about them is just a useful
metaphorical ﬁction ([8], footnote 10). Metaphorical ﬁctions cannot cause airliners to crash, banks to be robbed or even
dot-patterns to move on screens.
10 Fodor’s suggestion in [11] that every thought gets compiled into an innate “Language of thought” (LOT), presumably common to all humans, seems to
imply the wildly implausible claim that evolution provided new-born human babies with an internal language that can express quantum mechanics, or
even advanced scientiﬁc theories that have not yet been invented. I am not proposing that there is such an innate language: there are forms of development
that extend semantic competence, not discussed here. See http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#models.
11 In [66] it was suggested that we can deal with philosophical puzzles about qualia by regarding the contents of such internal detections in certain sorts
of machines as qualia.
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The fact that some VMs are not deﬁnable or detectable using the concepts or tools of physics does not make the concepts
subjective as some have supposed: it is not a matter of personal preference, or mere convenience, whether a portion of the
world is or is not accurately deﬁnable as containing a certain sort of virtual machine.12 The key point is that the concepts
used are relational in a way that is hard to explain simply. What makes the VM subsystems in a complex VM what they
are is the structure of the network of interacting causal connections, some internal, and some possibly external connections
mediated by sensors and motors. (It is possible to read Gilbert Ryle as attempting to say this sixty years ago in [38], but
lacking the concepts. Perhaps he should be credited as one of the inventors of the concept of a virtual machine.)
It is possible, in principle, though diﬃcult in practice, to specify such a network of interacting subsystems by a large
theory consisting of a collection of axioms with undeﬁned symbols referring to various parts and aspects of the system.
There will then be a difference between things that are and things that are not models of the collection of axioms, even
though checking whether something is or is not a model may be diﬃcult, e.g., if some of its parts are invisible virtual
machines. Where the system is one that has been designed by human engineers who know how it works we can have
more conﬁdence in our descriptions of what is going on inside it, based in part on having access to the programs that it
runs. However it is notoriously diﬃcult to determine that a system does exactly what its designers claim, and often “bugs”
do not show up until a system has been running for a long time. However, the fact that bugs can be detected and ﬁxed is
evidence that the virtual machines running in the system do largely conform to the theory provided by designers, though
it is not common for designers to express their theory axiomatically in a logical formalism. (It may become more common
in future.)
The undeﬁned symbols in the theory, referring to internal objects, relations, states, or processes in the active VM will
be implicitly deﬁned (or partially deﬁned if the theory is extendable) by their roles in the theory. At present, our ontology
for specifying roles is somewhat ad-hoc and ill-deﬁned, especially roles thought to be referred to by terms of ordinary
language, such as “desire”, “belief”, “intention”, and “emotion”. Some steps towards a more precisely deﬁned ontology are
taken in [67], including technical notions of “desire-like” and “belief-like” states. The theory may also refer to some causal
links between the system and other (e.g., physical) entities, events and processes, for example, in specifying input and
output devices and processes of perception and action. This is partly analogous to the “meaning postulates”, or “bridging
rules” that relate theoretical concepts in the physical sciences to possible observations and experiments, but without thereby
deﬁning those terms, e.g., Carnap [3].
5.6. Formalisms for describing VMs
Which formalisms are adequate for expressing such theories is a research question, though various subsets have been
explored by theoretical computer scientists. Any description of the physical details that leaves out the causal connections
between events in the VMs will fail to describe important features of the system, including some of the true generalisations
and counterfactual conditional statements about what would have happened if something speciﬁc had or had not happened:
e.g., if a certain move in chess had not been made then the opponent would not have been forced to sacriﬁce the queen.
There is no ﬁnite statement in terms of behaviours of atoms or electronic circuits that is equivalent to such a statement.
E.g., it might have been a game of postal chess using paper, or email, or some as yet undiscovered interplanetary mode of
communication.
5.7. VMs with continuously varying components
It may turn out that some kinds of virtual machine cannot be implemented with suﬃcient accuracy in digital computers
without adding analog components. Animals are made of interacting information-processing mechanisms of many sorts,
including chemical (molecular), electrical and ﬂuid-dynamical systems, whose functions scientists are still unravelling. This
raises the question whether such mechanisms are capable of supporting types of VM that computer scientists have not yet
thought of, perhaps including virtual machines for which conventional computers are inadequate.13
If a network of interacting virtual machines (“abstract dynamical systems”) includes some parts that vary continuously, a
formalism describing the network may need to include either components that vary continuously or suitable representations
of continuous variation (e.g., differential equations, or logical sentences describing the changes).
5.8. Loose coupling or non-coupling with the environment
Behaviourist psychology assumed, in effect, that statements about what can happen when a VM runs refer to externally
observable or physically measurable behaviour.
12 Wilkes writes in [73]: “. . . are ‘virtual machines’ real machines with ‘real’ states? This sort of question deserves much more attention than it has
received so far.”
13 The aims of the UK Computing Research Committee’s Grand Challenge XXXX.
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external sensors and motors, or to go through state changes that are too fast to be reﬂected in the input-output devices
because of their limited bandwidth. In such cases we can talk about what would become externally visible if there were
more components in the system, including higher bandwidth output devices.
There may be some VMs in a complex system that have to share output devices, so that some of the time one VM is
controlling output, while others are doing things, but not producing any external effects. This implies that internal com-
munication channels are not always switched “on”. For example, sighting a dangerous predator could suppress the normal
consequences of an internally detected need for food, e.g., moving to the location where the predator is and food also is.
If all the connections were always turned on, external behaviours could be a mishmash of consequences of multiple inter-
nal processes with undesirable effects—e.g., the machine attempting to move in two directions at the same time. Clearly
in a situation like that, a vector sum of inﬂuences can be far worse than a selection between inﬂuences (e.g., using a
“winner-takes-all” competitive mechanism). So the ability to “disconnect” output channels of some subsystems in order to
give unfettered control to high priority tasks is a useful design feature.
Likewise, some perceptual subsystems may do a lot of processing, whose results in certain circumstances have no in-
ﬂuence beyond the relatively low-level processing subsystems, because doing anything else with them within the system
in those circumstances would divert resources from more important and urgent tasks. So both “inward” and “outward”
information-ﬂows within the machine may be enabled or disabled according to context, without stopping the processing
that occurs before the suppressed link. Similar remarks about changing connectivity apply to other connections between
VMs within a larger system. The example of long term grief, which continues to exist while some of its inﬂuence is tem-
porarily suppressed was analysed in some detail in [74].
All of this implies that reliance on behavioural tests for what an information processing system is up to can be mislead-
ing. The truth of counterfactual conditional statements linking internal states and processes to consequences they would
have if conditions were appropriate may be diﬃcult to assess experimentally if not all the relevant conditions (including
internal conditions) can be manipulated in a laboratory. This not only implies that ﬁnding out how animals work can be
diﬃcult, but also that testing complete artiﬁcial systems can be diﬃcult for the same reasons. In many cases, however, the
components of such systems can be tested in isolation, before they are used in larger systems. In the case of biological
systems, some of the components may have been ﬁrst tested, and selected, in simpler evolutionary precursors, and then
retained because their cost is relatively low and they can occasionally be extremely useful.
5.9. Virtual machines, not quantum machines
Not one of the design options discussed in this paper depends on the virtual machines being implemented in machines
with quantum indeterminacy, as opposed to totally deterministic switching circuits. Arguments presented by Stapp and
others (see Section 3.1) that suggest that only a quantum-mechanical machine allows mental processes to have real effects,
all depend on ignorance of the ways in which virtual machines (including running operating systems, schedulers, word
processors, virus detectors, spam ﬁlters, etc. used by such people) can have real physical effects even though their powers,
as described above, are of the mental sort, including making inferences, and other manipulations of structures with semantic
content. All of this depends on the remarkable fact that a network of causal relationships between abstract virtual machine
states and processes, can play a role in controlling physical processes, and in some cases can even resist external attempts
to alter those processes—though such resistance has not yet matched the intransigence of HAL in the 2001 movie. That
network of causal relationships is related to the truth of a network of conditional statements.
6. Counterfactual conditionals and virtual machine behaviours
6.1. Potentialities inherent in VMs
Earlier it was pointed out that whether a subsystem has effects or not can depend on what else is going on. Similarly
when a subsystem does have effects, what the effects are can depend in complex ways on the context. A planning subsystem
in a robot may, during construction of a plan, get information from a visual subsystem about whether a certain door is open,
which inﬂuences a planning decision. If different information had been provided a different planning decision would have
been taken. This is one among many different true conditionals describing internal processes in virtual machines.
At some point it may turn out that two goals that the whole system is pursuing are in conﬂict. Detection of the conﬂict
by a monitoring VM can trigger a process in a conﬂict-resolution subsystem. At that point various other subsystems could
inﬂuence that decision, including a subsystem that proposes a compromise, such as a modiﬁcation of either goal or both,
so as to remove the conﬂict, or a motivational subsystem that uses ethical or aesthetic or practical considerations to select
one goal rather than the other.
It is also possible for a motivational or conﬂict-resolution subsystem to be undecided, causing the whole system to ask
another individual for help, or to toss a coin—possibly an “internal coin”. Collections of interacting VMs performing such
tasks are what Minsky was (mostly) describing in [29,30]. An early partially similar account can be found in [41, Chapter 6]
(now online).
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not for the fact that systems are being built and used all the time that work on these principles. My colleagues, students
and I have, for example, developed a toolkit used by students and researchers building such multi-component virtual ma-
chines14—which are nothing like the simple ﬁnite state virtual machines often used to explain philosophical functionalism,
e.g., Block, in [2], and there are many other such toolkits (e.g., see [71]). Despite any appearance of ﬁshiness due to untesta-
bility, the situation is not very different from the status of physical theories that postulate particles and processes whose
behaviours may be undetectable by any currently available devices. Moreover, the existence and operations of genes in or-
ganisms is another example of virtual machinery referred to by scientiﬁc theories, where the virtual machines are assumed
to be implemented in physical and chemical mechanisms even though many of the details are not yet understood.
6.2. On feeling and being free to choose
The existence of myriad true counterfactual conditionals, concerning how things might have gone differently, is part of
the basis for a self-monitoring machine to conclude that its choices are not compelled, so that it has a feeling of freedom to
choose otherwise than it actually chose. In fact what happens may be determined by the totality of what is in the system at
the time, and what information has been obtained about the environment, and that is as it should be: an intelligent agent’s
decisions should depend in systematic ways on its percepts, desires, preferences, hopes, fears, knowledge, expertise, and so
on, except where they do not determine which of a set of equally acceptable or equally unacceptable options is available, in
which case any mechanism, including a random generator, or possibly some socially inﬂuenced, arbitration mechanism that
the individual may be unaware of, can make the selection.
Even when the total system is determined, there is no part of the system that necessarily has to do whatever it actually
does, since other parts that inﬂuenced it work in such a way that they could have been in different states. (A more detailed
exposition of this point is in [48].) In all those cases, what happens in one part of the system, or in the whole system
depends in part on what happens in other subsystems, or how some part of the environment is perceived, and if the other
subsystems had been in different states the results could have been different.
These really are causal interactions between events and processes in different subsystems, and things that interact
causally are certainly things that exist—not just metaphorical ways of speaking, just as the poverty that can lead to crime
is part of a social virtual machine that has causal powers—and poverty certainly exists, as a social phenomenon, even if
it, like human mental processes, is ultimately implemented in a very large, indescribably complex, collection of physical
mechanisms on our planet. Neither poverty nor virtual machine states and processes in computers, are merely convenient
metaphors for complex physical interactions.
6.3. Machines that refer to the internals of other machines
It should be obvious that many of the problems of specifying precise meanings for both the language we use in talking
about virtual machines and the language used for explaining how the physical world works in terms of unobservable entities
and processes are examples of general problems regarding advanced scientiﬁc theories. The use of such “theoretical terms”
with only loose and indirect connections to observations was noticed by philosophers of science long ago (e.g., [3]).
There are similar problems for young children learning about the environment and for future intelligent machines. As
McCarthy notes, a young child needs to learn that objects in the environment can be made of different kinds of stuff, that
react differently to various kinds of inﬂuences. Simple examples are different sorts of liquids, more or less runny, more
or less sticky, etc., and different sorts of solids, more or less rigid, with different kinds of non-rigidity including plasticity,
elasticity, fragility, etc. Often the child’s immediately available means of perception do not suﬃce to distinguish such cases
and experiments on objects are then required to identify their properties, e.g., how much weight a beam can support before
it breaks, or whether a bent object will return to its original shape when the bending force is removed. McCarthy mentions
the requirement for a child both to be able to learn about the atomic theory of matter, and that animate objects are to be
understood in terms of their desires and actions. He could have mentioned many more examples.
Our ability to think about, and form theories about, virtual machines in systems we have not built ourselves is a special
case of our ability to refer to unobservable features of the environment. It is hard to tell how much of this other animals can
do, since learnt or evolved, reactions to complex objects in the environment need not be based on any theory of why those
reactions are appropriate—though in that case the expertise will have deﬁnite limits, whereas someone with an explanatory
theory can often derive new consequences about what will happen, or what can be done, in novel situations.
If future robots or other machines are to have human-like intelligence then they, like us, will need to be able to make use
of concepts that cannot be deﬁned in terms of what they can sense in the environment, but which have a role in theories
that can be used in understanding and acting on the environment in creative ways, e.g., ﬁnding new ways to achieve or
prevent physical states of affairs, or new ways to deceive or to persuade other individuals.
This use of theoretical terms referring to unobservable entities is incompatible with the philosophical theory of concept
empiricism, rejected by Immanuel Kant over two centuries ago, and more ﬁrmly demolished by 20th century philosophers
14 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/poplog/packages/simagent.html.
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concept empiricism was recently resurrected in the form of “Symbol Grounding” theory [15] and has confused many AI
researchers who lacked a philosophical education.15 Designing a robot so that all its symbols are “grounded” as required by
the theory is a way of making sure that it has serious limitations as an intelligent system.
6.4. Substantive scientiﬁc questions about VMs
All this leaves open the question: what sorts of virtual machinery are useful for various kinds of behaving system
interacting productively with various environments? Despite the fact that AI has been going for over half a century, the
problems that deﬁne the various sorts of niche that need to be dealt with by human-like robots have not yet been fully
identiﬁed. The situation is not that we know what problems have to be solved and simply have not solved them yet: rather
the process of specifying the problems is still on-going. Many of McCarthy’s discussions, e.g., of the well-designed child
[24] and self-conscious machines [23] are contributions to analysis of requirements, interspersed with suggested partial
solutions. Identifying the requirements is the more important task.
Theories like Stapp’s, and most theories of consciousness proposed by philosophers and physicists, ignore the detailed
requirements for scientiﬁc explanations of how animals, including humans, work. This is common among researchers who
have no experience of attempting to design working systems yet propose explanations of how humans or animals work.
Unfortunately, researchers who do have such experience make different mistakes because they also do not analyse the
requirements in suﬃcient detail.
7. What sort of architecture is required?
One of the substantial questions is: what sorts of architecture are required for animals and machines that have to meet
different requirements? That requires us to have a good way of thinking about both how requirements can vary and how
architectures can vary. At present many architectures in AI are assembled in what appears to be an ad hoc fashion, on
the basis of hunches about what the problems are and how they can be solved, without any systematic overview of what
the options are from which selections are made, and how variations in requirements should affect variations in designs.
Instead, many papers simply present architectures without a deep analysis of the space of options: that may sometimes be
acceptable for getting applications to work (if they work) but not for advancing our scientiﬁc understanding.
There are various ways of thinking about the space of designs and it is not yet clear how best to do this. One idea,
inspired by chapter 25 of Nilsson’s [33], combines two divisions of functionality among the information-processing com-
ponents in an animal or machine, namely in terms of “towers” and “layers”, as described in Section 10 of [63]. This is the
basis of the CogAff schema proposed for describing architectures.16
The three (overlapping) “towers of functionality” are perception, action, and more central processing. There are different
ways of thinking about “layers of functionality”, and different researchers consider different numbers of layers. The CogAff
schema uses layers corresponding roughly to evolutionary age in animals and computational abstraction in animals and
machines: reactive layers evolved ﬁrst, and mainly perform functions of responding to sensed (external or internal) situa-
tions and events by changing something (externally or internally). Deliberative layers, of varying sophistication, can consider
and evaluate possible structures, events and processes including spatially or temporally composed possibilities [59]. Finally,
layers of functionality which some have labelled “reﬂective”, or “meta-management” layers, which I prefer now to label
“meta-semantic”, include the ability to represent, monitor, reason about, learn about and evaluate and act on other layers.17
There are several ways in which the division into layers and towers is over-simple and does not allow for nearly enough
sub-divisions. Analysing the tradeoffs properly will depend on looking closely at many of the detailed evolutionary and
developmental transitions found in organisms as well as many types of engineering problem.
7.1. Layered dynamical systems
There are different ways of investigating requirements. One approach is to reﬂect on and analyse facts that are widely
known but whose implications have not been noticed. E.g., what cognitive functions are involved in building a nest from
twigs, as opposed to mud? Much of McCarthy’s work involves such analysis. Another approach is to construct experiments
that reveal features of human (or animal) competence that need to be explained, especially features related to common
ways of interacting with the environment. Ambiguous pictures that ﬂip between two different interpretations without any-
thing changing in the image help to identify some requirements for visual perception: the differences between the two
interpretations help to identify what needs to be represented in a visual system: it cannot be a matter of describing or
15 A discussion of limitations of concept empiricism is available online in http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#models “Why symbol-
grounding is both impossible and unnecessary, and why theory-tethering is more powerful anyway”.
16 Progress report: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/03.html#200307.
17 One of the hard problems of meta-semantic competence is how to handle referential opacity—very brieﬂy deﬁned in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Opaque_context. McCarthy [25] favours a solution expressed in a logical form, whereas I suggest speciﬁc architectural designs are needed. But that is a
topic for another occasion.
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perceiver moves. When perceivers move there are changes in which surfaces are visible, aspect ratios, and other geometric
and topological changes in the information available to the perceiver, as well as subtle changes in highlights and reﬂected
illumination. Sometimes what changes is that new possibilities and new impossibilities are perceived [61,63].
Gibson’s [13] has rightly been highly inﬂuential in both psychology and AI. He pointed out that the contents of what is
seen are not just physical and geometrical facts about the environment, but also include affordances relevant to actions that
could be performed and goals the perceiver could have. However, that is just a special subset of something more general,
which includes perception of possible motions, and constraints on motions, that need not involve the perceiver’s actions or
preferences [52]. We could call that perceiving “proto-affordances”, since proto-affordances can become affordances if they
have features relevant to the perceiver’s desires, preferences, needs and capabilities.
There is also perception of what information is or is not available, i.e. perception of “epistemic affordances”. Changes
in epistemic affordances can also be perceived, e.g., perceiving that something is being progressively hidden by something
else. An important aspect of learning is discovering relations between action affordances and epistemic affordances: e.g.,
doing some actions may increase or decrease epistemic affordances, by changing the information available about some task.
Michael Brenner has pointed out in discussion that some actions, or events occurring in the environment, can be seen to
provide information relevant to an unﬁnished planning task, or information suggesting that an existing plan needs to be
revised: these could be called “deliberative affordances”.
7.2. Speed of information processing in humans
Those changes of perceptual content, at various levels of abstraction, can happen very quickly in ways that no current
computer vision system can match, and no known neuropsychological theories can explain.
An example demonstration is an experiment available online as a pdf ﬁle.18 Viewers are shown a sequence of unrelated
pictures at the rate of about one per second, and then asked questions at various levels of abstraction about what they have
seen. This is intended to probe requirements for human-like vision that seem to be involved in going round a large opaque
obstacle or looking out of a window for the ﬁrst time, or moving something that blocks one’s line of sight, and many other
transitions involving suddenly perceiving a new complex scene that may require rapid and complex reactions (in contrast
with simply ducking or moving sideways to avoid a rapidly approaching object, for example).
Thinking about possible ways of explaining how the demonstrated visual processing speed might be achieved, in contexts
where details of what is seen may be unclear, noisy, or partially obstructed by dirty windows, rain, poor light, etc., led to
the hypothesised multi-level network of dynamical systems (virtual machines that can rapidly change their state, subject to
constraints of many kinds with many sources) depicted crudely in Fig. 2. For more on this see [61,63].
One function of the concurrency in such a system is to allow mixed top-down, bottom-up and middle-out processing.
Another is to allow some VMs to have the role of monitoring and modulating others. I conjecture that a perceptual archi-
tecture of this general kind is connected with the development of mathematical competences alluded to in the title of this
paper, as will now be explained below.
The rest of this paper focuses on a particular problem that not only still needs to be solved, but has not been generally
recognised to exist. Although AI researchers have been working on how to design machines that can solve various classes of
mathematical problems, they appear not to have noticed what it is about our environment that caused biological evolution
to produce a species that developed certain sorts of mathematical competences as a result of the problems and opportunities
for action afforded by that environment.
8. Animal intelligence and human mathematics
8.1. AI and philosophy of mathematics
My own original motivation for getting involved in AI, nearly 40 years ago, was not based on the grand vision described
above: I was merely trying to understand myself. In particular, after a degree in mathematics and physics, I was seduced
by philosophy, and worked on a DPhil thesis [39] defending Kant’s view of the nature of mathematical discoveries in his
Critique of Pure Reason [19], at least as I understood him. I tried to show that Kant was correct in arguing, against an
opinion attributed to Hume, favoured by many analytical philosophers when I was a student, namely that mathematics was
inherently trivial: a collection of tautologies in elaborate disguises. A variant of this was Bertrand Russell’s assertion in [37]:
“Mathematics may be deﬁned as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are
saying is true.” I tried to defend Kant by showing that mathematical discoveries expand our knowledge, for example about
spatial structures and about counting procedures, but not in the same way as empirical discoveries, such as the discovery
that many substances expand on being heated.
About six years later I started learning about AI, as a result of getting to know Max Clowes [42], who introduced me
to work done on machine vision in the 1960s (e.g., [18]) and especially the writings of Marvin Minsky (e.g., [26,27] and
18 See http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/multipic-challeng.pdf. There are questions of varying degrees of abstraction after the pic-
tures, probing the forms of processing that may have taken place when the pictures are viewed fairly quickly.
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components are closely linked to sensory and motor transducers. Some are more and some less remote from sensorimotor interfaces, with more remote
subsystems able to refer to un-sensed aspects of reality. Some involve continuous dynamics, others discrete changes. At any time many components may
be dormant, while capable of being rapidly activated (top-down, bottom-up or sideways) by the constraint network. The various perceptual (e.g., visual)
subsystems are connected with more central processing subsystems and in some cases also with action subsystems, e.g., for reﬂexes, or active sensing
mechanisms.
other papers in [28]) and John McCarthy [22,25]. Those papers should still be compulsory reading for students studying AI,
cognitive science, theoretical psychology and philosophy, but alas fashions change and they have been forgotten or ignored
by teachers in those ﬁelds. Some of Chomsky’s ideas in [5], e.g., about generative power, the performance/competence
distinction, and varieties of adequacy (extended by McCarthy and Hayes) were also important.
Although I did not agree with everything they wrote, the AI theorists transformed my way of thinking about philosophy,
mainly by introducing me to the idea of an information-processing mechanism that could operate on many kinds of more
or less abstract information structures, albeit implemented concretely in a physical machine—as explained in preceding
sections.
However, around that time much of AI was focused on what went on inside intelligent machines, with the exception of
a few robotic projects, such as Shakey at Stanford (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shakey_the_Robot) and Freddy in Edinburgh
(http://www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/freddy/) [1], whereas I was sure that my ability to do mathematics, including logic and set
theory, was connected with my ability to see things in the environment, or at least the mechanisms that support that ability
and which could also function when my eyes were shut.19
In the thesis I had defended Kant merely by presenting and analysing examples of mathematical concepts and discover-
ies. As a result of learning about AI, I became convinced that if we could produce a machine that could make mathematical
discoveries in something like the way I (and many mathematicians) did, that would help to show why Kant was right and
his opponents wrong. However, unlike the majority of AI researchers at that time, e.g., McCarthy and Hayes in [22], I did
not think that the robot would do all its mathematical reasoning using logic. On the contrary, I knew I could reason using
diagrams (whether on paper or in my mind made no difference [58]) and in my ﬁrst AI paper, at IJCAI 1971 [40], I argued
that, for some purposes, spatial, diagrammatic reasoning might be more useful than logical reasoning, and just as rigorous,
though in a different way. This got me an invitation to spend a year at Edinburgh University (1972–1973) learning more
about AI and especially learning to write programs (in POP-2 and Lisp). I later learnt that several other researchers had also
thought spatial/diagrammatic reasoning important for AI, e.g., see [14].
19 There have been outstanding blind mathematicians, of course. But their brains, like mine, were products of evolution in a species with sophisticated
visual capabilities.
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Several things became clear that were written up in a book a few years later [41] (now online). First, the kind of visual
reasoning system I had in mind had to be embedded in a rich, multi-functional architecture containing many different sorts
of mechanisms interacting with one another [41, Chapter 6], whereas most of the work in AI at that time seemed to be
concerned with developing an algorithm to do one thing at a time, e.g., ﬁnd a plan, ﬁnd a proof, parse a sentence, recognise
a pattern, answer a question, etc. Second, examining many examples of uses of vision showed that producing visual systems
was a far more complex task than I had realised at ﬁrst and would itself require visual sub-processes operating concurrently
at different levels of abstraction, as explained in [41, Chapters 6 and 9]. However at that stage I did not appreciate the
importance of concurrent perception of processes at different levels of abstraction, mentioned above in Section 7.1, and
discussed further in [61,63].
Third, as a result of watching a child both learning to count and discovering features of counting processes (such as
that one way to answer “What number comes before N?” is to count up to N , and then use your memory of the last
number uttered), I realised that many mathematical discoveries were discoveries about properties of processes, especially
processes involving two discrete sub-processes performed in parallel and in synchrony, like pointing and reciting number
names. Many applications of number concepts require the ability to generate such synchronised processes, but with different
stopping conditions—e.g., stop when one of the processes cannot continue (no more marbles) or stop when some stage in
one of the processes has been reached (fetching six marbles), as described in [41, Chapter 8].20
Fourth, it became clear that some discoveries made by a learner could start off empirical (e.g., discovering that counting
a row of objects from left to right gave the same result as counting from right to left) but as the learner acquired a deeper
understanding of what was going on such discoveries could be seen not to be empirical, but examples of necessary truths.
8.3. Transformation of epistemic status
This ability to make an empirical discovery then later realise that it is not empirical is, of course, not restricted to
childhood. Many readers of this journal will have had experience of trying to solve puzzles in a certain way, then discovering
after a while that their failures, initially discovered empirically, were provably necessary consequences of the relationship
between the methods used and the structure of the problem. For example, if you have a rectangular slab of chocolate made
of e.g., 6 by 8 squares and you try to break it into the individual squares by breaking one piece at a time, using a linear
break, you can try different sequences of breaking actions but will always need 47 of them. After thinking about it you will
see that is an inevitable consequence of the structure of the problem and, moreover, for any array of squares the number of
breaks is one less than the number of squares.21
Another example: try drawing a circle and a triangle on a plane and counting the number of contact points, where a
contact point is either an intersection between an edge of the triangle and the circumference of the circle, or a vertex of the
triangle lying on the circumference or an edge forming a tangent to the circle. You will ﬁnd that there can be any number
of contact points between 0 and 6, but no more, and the upper limit cannot be exceeded no matter what the size of the
circle, and the size and shape of the triangle and its location in relation to the circle. Moreover, if the diameter of the circle
is much less than the length of the shortest side of the triangle, it will not be possible to produce six contact points, and
likewise if the diameter is much longer than the length of the longest side.
Programmers discover many more such relationships between structures and processes, some of them discovered em-
pirically at ﬁrst then later understood to be exceptionless, two familiar and useful examples being (a) the correspondence
between a process of depth-ﬁrst search in a tree or graph structure and a loop using a stack of options (last in, ﬁrst out)
and (b) the correspondence between breadth-ﬁrst search and the use of a queue of options (ﬁrst in, ﬁrst out).
The claim that some of the discoveries turn out not to be empirical does not imply that we are infallible, or that future
robots will have to be. In [21], Lakatos showed how mathematicians can produce fallacious proofs then later discover the
bugs in the proofs and try ﬁxing them in various ways. This will also be true of young children, intelligent robots and
other humans: we can all make mistakes even when doing mathematics. So a good explanation of the capabilities under
discussion will have to show why the methods used are fallible, how mistakes can be detected, and how, in some cases the
mistakes can be corrected. Sussman in [72] presented an architecture for a self-extending self-debugging planning system,
though with no understanding of the empirical/non-empirical distinction. In [34] Alison Pease attempted to model some
simple examples, not connected with any ability to perceive and act on objects in a 3-D environment. There is still a long
way to go.
8.4. Problems of being a baby, or toddler
The process of making empirical discoveries that can later be found to have a non-empirical, mathematical, basis is not
restricted to artiﬁcial puzzles and activities of programmers and mathematicians. This seems to be a deep feature of the
20 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/crp/chap8.html.
21 Some qualiﬁcations and special cases are discussed in this presentation http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#math-robot.
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even though what is perceived (including shapes, orientations, curvature, relative thickness, etc.) is not perceived with great precision. You can probably
visualise various ways in which using your right hand, your left hand, both hands, your teeth, you could get the saucer onto the table, the cup on the saucer
and the spoon in the cup. A challenge is to devise forms of representation that (a) are derivable from images despite poor image quality, and (b) have
suﬃcient deﬁniteness to allow actions to be planned and executed reliably. Initially a baby could not do this but a normal child will eventually develop the
ability both to do it and to describe how to do it.
process of learning to interact with a structured spatial environment, though not all animals that do such learning seem
to have the ability to make the transition from empirical to non-empirical understanding. Humans cannot do it from birth,
though I do not yet know when the change starts, nor exactly what makes it possible, except that it seems to require an
architecture that supports monitoring of processes while they are performed in order to discover features of those processes,
and then construct an ontology and a theory that allows those features to be explained in a general way. Some conjectures
that are relevant to this are in [4].
For example, discovering that some things are rigid and impenetrable, allows many different generalisations to be de-
rived. E.g., if rod made of a rigid and impenetrable material is in a corridor with parallel walls made of rigid impenetrable
material and the length of the rod exceeds the distance between the walls, then the direction of the rod cannot be reversed
by rotating it in a horizontal plane. It can be reversed by rotating vertically if the ceiling is high enough, or there is no
ceiling. Otherwise it can be rotated by moving the rod into a big adjoining room, rotating it there and moving it back into
the corridor. One important thing about this is that if a child understands the problem then she can tell that the colour of
the rod is irrelevant, that various aspects of the shape of the rod, the texture of the walls, which hand is used to hold the
rod, etc. are all irrelevant to what prevents the rotation. A purely statistical (e.g., Bayesian) learner would have to collect
evidence for each new case.
A closely related result is that if two co-planar gear wheels made of rigid, impenetrable material are meshed and pivoted
centrally, then if one is rotated the other must also rotate, in the opposite direction. What would happen if a third gear
wheel was added, meshed with both of them?
In [12] many examples of learning about affordances in young children are described. It seems to be assumed by the
authors, and by many psychologists that there are only two ways for a child to learn what can and cannot occur, namely
either by trial and error, or by learning from someone else, either by imitation or being instructed. However, there is
another possibility: working things out. Having an appropriate theory about what is going on allows a child to work out
what must happen even in some situations that have never previously been encountered, e.g., where new shapes are
concerned, whereas if the learning were purely empirical every new situation would have to be tested before predictions
could be relied on. Compare Fig. 3.
8.5. Logical and non-logical forms of representation
In principle it would be possible to formulate theories about what is going on using logic and to derive all the discovered
non-contingent truths from the theory, if the theory had enough axioms and inference rules. But it seems that humans, and
presumably some other animals, can do such reasoning by visualising processes occurring subject to constraints. This seems
to involve running a spatial modelling visual machine, although in complex cases it may have to be supplemented with
physical diagrams and models. However, this does not imply that precise models of the scenes under discussion need to be
created. In fact in some cases forms of representation seem to be used that express inconsistent contents, as shown by the
Penrose triangle and Escher’s drawings, which a model could not do.
Subject to those caveats, we need to produce visualisation processes that allow predictions or planning processes to be
based fairly directly on what is seen, instead of having to ﬁrst translate contents of perception to logic, make deductions,
then translate back in order to know what to expect. I tried to make points like this 37 years ago in [40] but there still does
not seem to be any AI system that convincingly illustrates these capabilities, although various partial capabilities have been
implemented, e.g., [17].
I suspect that the task is far more complex than it seems because new forms of representation are required and also
new forms of self-monitoring architecture that can enable a robot to discover that some of its learnt generalisations are
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might otherwise pursue more popular objectives.
9. Challenges
A challenge for AI is to work out in more detail the requirements and develop working designs. For AI as science there
needs to be systematic analysis of tradeoffs between various sets of requirements and possible designs.
A challenge for developmental psychology is to understand the role of the processes described above, in the development
of young minds.
A challenge for biology is to explain how such abilities are related to biological advantages, and how the human genome
(and perhaps other genomes) can encode the abilities to learn and develop as described here.
A challenge for educationalists is to develop teaching strategies, especially in mathematics, that relate more effectively
to the mechanisms in young learners, and what those mechanisms can and cannot do at various stages of development.
A challenge for philosophers is to absorb the implications of all this for philosophy of mathematics. I think it provides at
least a partial vindication of Kant [19], and in particular
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be
awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse
the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the
raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the order of
time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.
But what starts empirical need not remain empirical, as we have seen.
9.1. Confusions about embodiment
A challenge for the interdisciplinary research community concerned with embodiment is to undo some of the damage
done to research and education in AI and cognitive science by over-emphasising the role of embodiment in intelligence.
What seems to be most important about embodiment (e.g., what drove the most signiﬁcant evolutionary developments
in mammal and bird cognition) is not the precise morphology of humans and other animals but rather the need to be
able to perceive and interact with 3-D structures and processes (including manipulating, assembling and disassembling 3-D
structures) and the need to be able to think about spatially located events, processes and entities in the past, remote spatial
regions, and the future.
As noted in [60] the development of bodies with independently movable manipulators that could be used to assemble
and disassemble 3-D structures of varying types and complexity added signiﬁcant information-processing, representational,
and ontological demands.22 In contrast, much of the work on embodied cognition in robots has focused on the terribly
narrow problem of learning about sensorimotor relationships, often in the context of a robot that is little more than a
mobile point with a viewing direction.
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